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1. INTRODUCTION
In March 1997, a Canadian subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
faced an increasingly common dilemma. United States authorities
demanded that it comply with U.S. sanctions regulations by end-
ing sales in Canada of clothing that is manufactured in Cuba. At
the same time, Canadian authorities insisted that Wal-Mart Canada
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Ltd. continue to carry the Cuban-origin products or face fines of up
to C$1.5 million for noncompliance with countermeasures de-
signed to neutralize the impact of U.S. sanctions.' The company's
first response was to remove the items from its stores, but it re-
versed course within two weeks. After apparently deciding that
the risk of liability was more severe under Canadian law, Wal-Mart
Canada announced that it was restocking its shelves with Cuban-
origin clothing.2 A U.S. government spokesman later stated that
U.S. officials are considering whether or not to take action against
Wal-Mart.3
This Article reviews U.S. extraterritorial sanctions, countermea-
sures established by other jurisdictions, difficulties that arise when
the two overlap and possible means of dealing with conflicting le-
gal requirements. Section 2 outlines foremost U.S. sanctions that
have an extraterritorial scope: (1) embargo regulations, particularly
as they apply to U.S.-owned or controlled foreign companies and
to reexports of U.S.-origin items by foreign persons; (2) recent stat-
utes that strengthen extraterritorial sanctions against Cuba, specifi-
cally the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and 1996 Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act or "Helms-Burton Act" as
it is popularly known; and (3) the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, which mandates "secondary boycott" sanctions against for-
eign persons who pursue major petroleum-related investments in
Iran or Libya.
Section 3 reviews countermeasures established by the Euro-
pean Union ("EU"), Canada, Mexico and others in response to ex-
traterritorial U.S. sanctions. The principal elements of these coun-
termeasures forbid compliance with U.S. sanctions ("blocking"
provisions), prohibit recognition of judgments under U.S. sanctions
and authorize recovery of damages attributable to judgments
handed down under U.S. sanctions ("clawback" provisions).
Section 4 describes challenges to U.S. extraterritorial sanctions
under international trade agreements and related negotiations to
reconcile U.S. and foreign policies. Dispute settlement initiatives
1 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, §7(1)(a) (1985) (Can.)
[hereinafter FEMA], as amended by Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 28, §6 (1997) (Can.) [hereinafter Act to Amend FEMA].
2 See Treasury Reviewing Wal-Mart Canada Decision to Sell Cuban-Made Pajamas,
DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTvEs (BNA), Mar. 17, 1997, at A14.
3 See Norman Kempster, Wal-Mart May Face Sanctions Over Cuban PJs Policy,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1997, at Di.
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have not been pursued to a decision, but negotiations have not suc-
ceeded in freeing companies from conflicting national laws. This is
true notwithstanding agreements that the United States and the EU
concluded in May 1998 that were intended to address EU concerns
about extraterritorial sanctions and the United States' desire for
coordinated sanctions policies, particularly with respect to Cuba.
Key arrangements are contingent on enactment of U.S. legislation
to insulate EU persons from the Helms-Burton Act alien-exclusion
provisions, but prospects are minimal of such legislation passing
the Congress in the foreseeable future.
Section 5 assesses the potential legal liability and other prob-
lems for a company that, like Wal-Mart, is caught between the dic-
tates of U.S. sanctions and foreign countermeasures.
Section 6 identifies possible means of minimizing risks of diffi-
culty for companies that might face this conundrum. Careful for-
mulation and implementation of internal guidelines can be of sub-
stantial benefit. The first and most important step is to make
informed, advance decisions about how to address conflicting legal
requirements rather than waiting for problems to arise.
2. KEY U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL SANCTIONS
The United States maintains scores of legal measures that are
extraterritorial in the sense that they seek to affect the conduct of
foreign persons outside the United States. At present, the extrater-
ritorial measures described below attract the most strenuous objec-
tions from other countries and are the foremost targets of sanctions
countermeasures. They are particularly controversial because they
attempt to induce foreign persons abroad to forego economic activ-
ity in order to advance the foreign policy goals of the U.S. govern-
ment. The United States' trading partners complain that these
measures unjustifiably encroach on sovereign rights of self-
government. 4
4 U.S. sanctions directed at overseas transfers of items based on national se-
curity - rather than foreign policy - rationale have not generated as much contro-
versy, presumably due to a consensus among developed countries that controls
are needed on such items. Such sanctions include, for example, secondary boycott
measures relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See, e.g., 22
U.S.C. § 2798 (1994); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(1994) (setting forth chemical and bio-
logical weapons proliferation sanctions).
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2.1. Embargo Regulations
The United States maintains broad trade and investment em-
bargoes against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Sudan.
The principal embargo requirements are embodied in regulations
administered by the Department of the Treasury.5 The embargoes'
export-related prohibitions are reinforced and broadened in some
respects by the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR") ad-
ministered by the Department of Commerce.6 The U.S. embargo
on Iraq is less of a source of friction with other countries because,
unlike the other five, it is in harmony with multilateral sanctions
requirements. 7
The U.S. embargoes are extraterritorial in two important re-
spects. First, the embargoes of Cuba and North Korea purport to
5 See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1998); Prohibiting
Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997); Iranian
Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1998); Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. pt. 575 (1998); Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1998); For-
eign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1998); Sudanese Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 538 (1998). Other regulations administered by the
Treasury Department impose sanctions against foreign individuals and entities
designated as narcotics traffickers, Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. pt. 536 (1998), and foreign individuals and entities designated as terrorists,
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 595 (1998); Terrorism List Govern-
ments Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 596 (1998); Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tions Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 597 (1998). The Treasury Department
also administers a ban on new investment in Burma, Burmese Sanctions Regula-
tions, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537(1998), and the blocking of property of the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and a ban on new
investment in Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
Kosovo Sanctions Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 54,576-85 (1998) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 586). The Treasury Department has authorized prospective transactions
involving property in which the Government of Montenegro has an interest. See
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Kosovo Sanctions Regu-
lations, 63 Fed. Reg. at 54,584.
6 See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-74 (1998). Prior to
its expiration on August 20, 1994, the Export Administration Act provided the
primary statutory basis for the EAR. Since that time, the EAR have been main-
tained under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Exec. Order No.
12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994). Exports and reexports of military-related items
("defense articles" and "defense services") are controlled by the State Department
under the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), and
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (1998). The
State Department maintains a policy of license denial for shipments to the embar-
goed countries. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1.
7 See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990).
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preclude foreign companies that are owned or controlled by U.S.
persons from conducting business with Cuba or North Korea. This
aspect of the Cuba sanctions arose as an issue for Wal-Mart's Ca-
nadian subsidiary. Second, the embargo regulations generally
purport to forbid foreign persons to export to the embargoed coun-
try most items that are of U.S. origin or that contain U.S. content
(e.g., U.S.-origin parts). Such third-country transactions are refer-
enced, collectively, as "reexports." 8 While the administering agen-
cies can license these transactions, by and large, the agencies apply
a general policy of license denial for embargoed destinations.9
2.1.1. Application of Cuban and North Korean Embargoes to U.S.-
Owned or Controlled Foreign Companies
The embargo regulations applicable to Cuba ("Cuban Assets
Control Regulations" or "CACR") and to North Korea ("Foreign
Assets Control Regulations" or "FACR") contain asset-blocking
provisions that broadly prohibit business with these countries.
These provisions forbid "[a]ll dealings" in property by "any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," if such dealings in-
volve property in which Cuba, North Korea or a Cuban or North
Korean national has "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct
or indirect."' 0 Courts have construed these provisions expan-
sively." The Treasury Department considers them to ban activity
with only an attenuated connection to the target country, such as
8 U.S. regulations are not always clear as to whether the term "reexport" cov-
ers third-country exports of items that include U.S. content, but the EAR's defini-
tion of the term suggests that it does. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2(b)(4), 734.3(a)(3)
(1998). In some circumstances, the EAR also forbid the reexport and export from
abroad to some locations of the foreign-produced product of controlled technol-
ogy and software. See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3).
9 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(b) (implementing policy of denial for Cuba). But
see 15 C.F.R. § 746.4(c) (implementing limited policy of license denial for Libya).
As regards trade with Cuba by foreign, U.S.-owned or controlled companies, the
policy of license denial is statutorily mandated. See infra Section 2.1.1.
10 Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201(b) (1998) [herein-
after FACR]; Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) (1998) [here-
inafter CACR]. The FACR continue to have some applicability to property in
which there exists a Cambodian or Vietnamese interest, but the regulations pro-
vide blanket authorization for future transactions relating to such property (apart
from transactions relating to property blocked in the name of the Exchange Sup-
port Fund for the Khmer Republic). See 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.570, 500.578.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Broverman, 180 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(discussing how China retained an "interest," within the meaning of the FACR, in
product that was exported from China to Canada and then to the United States).
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an aircraft lease to a third-country airline if some of the subject air-
craft will be used, in part, for routes to and from Cuba.
The extraordinary scope of these provisions derives primarily
from the regulations' definition of "person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States"; the phrase embraces not just U.S. citi-
zens and residents, persons in the United States and corporations
organized under U.S. law ("U.S. persons"), but also "[a]ny corpora-
tion, partnership, or association, wherever organized or doing
business, that is owned or controlled by" such persons. 12 By their
terms, then, the regulations ban, for example, a bank operating in
and organized under the laws of Spain from guaranteeing a loan to
a Cuban firm if the bank is owned or controlled by U.S. persons.
This makes the sanctions controversial internationally since, under
customary international law, a company is ordinarily considered to
be a national of the state under the laws of which it is organized.13
In 1975, the Treasury Department amended the CACR to an-
nounce that it would, "in appropriate cases," issue licenses for oth-
erwise prohibited trade transactions relating to Cuba by foreign
U.S.-owned or controlled companies if specified criteria were satis-
fied.14 The new policy facilitated trade between Cuba and overseas
subsidiaries of U.S. companies valued at an estimated $718 million
12 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (regarding North Korea); 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (regarding
Cuba). Apart from the reexport requirements discussed in Section 2.1.2., the U.S.
embargoes against Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan generally apply to "U.S. persons,"
a narrower term which excludes all foreign-chartered companies. See 31 C.F.R. §
560.201-.209, .314 (Iran) ; 31 C.F.R. § 575.201-.210, .321 (Iraq); 31 C.F.R. § 550.201-
.208, .308 (Libya); 31 C.F.R. § 538.201-209, .315 (Sudan). A U.S. parent company
could, however, be prosecuted for actions of its foreign subsidiaries that are con-
trary to the Iran, Iraq, Libya or Sudan embargoes under principles of agency, ac-
complice or conspiracy liability if it directs or facilitates those actions. Cf 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949);
Morgan v. United States, 149 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1945). But see J. Ellicott, Sover-
eignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Export Control Arena, 20
CAN.-U.S. L. J. 133, 136 (1994) (discussing how under an "extreme construction[]"
maintained by "some of the regulators in Washington," the regulations preclude a
parent company from telling its foreign subsidiary that "it is okay to go ahead"
with a transaction that falls within the terms of a prohibition).
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 213 (1987).
14 See 40 Fed. Reg. 47,108 (1975) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1976)). Ac-
cording to a Treasury Department official, the agency issued licenses automatical-
ly under Section 515.599 provided the regulatory criteria were satisfied. See Clara
David, Trading with Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and Export Rules, 8 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 385, 387 (1993). The 1975 amendment replaced a qualified general license per-
mitting certain transactions by foreign, U.S.-owned or controlled, non-banking
companies with Cuba. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1963-75).
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in 1991.15 In 1992, this relaxation of the Cuban embargo was termi-
nated by the "Mack Amendment," a portion of the Cuban Democ-
racy Act which forbids the issuance of licenses pursuant to the 1975
policy.16
The CACR and FACR both contain another provision that car-
ries the potential for extraterritorial application of these embar-
goes. The regulations prohibit "[a]ll transfers outside the United
States with regard to any property or property interest subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" if such transactions involve
property in which Cuba, North Korea or a Cuban or North Korean
national has "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indi-
rect."' 7 The regulations do not define "property subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States" other than to identify certain types
of securities as examples of such property. 18 The U.S. government
could potentially invoke these provisions to seize U.S.-origin or
U.S.-owned property that is involved in a transaction relating to
Cuba or North Korea even if no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction
is involved. Such action would be based on the theory that the
property's U.S. origin or ownership renders it subject to U.S. juris-
diction.19
15 See David, supra note 14, at 388.
16 See Cuban Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1706(a), 106 Stat. 2315,
2578 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a) (1994)); accord 31 C.F.R. §
515.559(a) (1998). The statute permits the issuance of licenses to foreign, U.S.-
owned or controlled companies for contracts executed before October 23, 1992.
See 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(2) (1994); accord 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a)(1) (1998).
17 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201(b), 515.201(b) (1998).
18 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.313, 515.313. The definitions specify that the term in-
cludes, "without limitation," securities: (1) issued by the U.S. Government, a sub--
federal government or a person within the United States, or (2) for which the in-
struments evidencing the securities are located in the United States. See id.
19 Some Treasury Department officials have indicated that they construe the
CACR and FACR generally not to extend to overseas transactions that do not in-
volve persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, but this view could change based on po-
litical developments relating to Cuba and North Korea. The United States ap-
pears, in other contexts, to rely on the U.S. origin of property to bring, in its view,
transactions within U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction. In general, the U.S origin of a
reexported item (or the content therein) provides the only apparent basis on
which one can argue that the prescriptive jurisdiction exercised through U.S. re-
export sanctions is consistent with international law. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 13, at § 431, comment (d) (implying that pre-
scriptive jurisdiction for reexport controls is reasonable due to the U.S. origin of
the items). It reportedly has been argued that EAR reexport controls are justified
based on the foreign party having consented to the application of the regulations
by executing end-use statements and written assurances, which are required for
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2.1.2. Prohibitions on Reexports by Foreign Persons
The embargoes uniformly prohibit U.S. persons -individuals
who are U.S. citizens, U.S. residents or in the United States and
U.S.-chartered companies -to export most goods, technology and
services to a sanctioned destination or person regardless of the lo-
cation from which the export is made (from the United States or
elsewhere). 20 To varying degrees, the embargoes also purport to
forbid non-U.S. persons from reexporting U.S.-origin items from
third countries to sanctioned destinations (and, sometimes, sanc-
tioned governments). These controls can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Cuba: The EAR forbid reexports by any person to Cuba of most
U.S.-origin commodities, software and technology and such items
that contain a super-de minimis level of U.S. content. 21 Under the
EAR, U.S. content is generally de minimis for exports to the embar-
goed countries if it is ten percent or less of the export's value.22 As
discussed above, the CACR also prohibit reexports to, and other
transactions with, Cuba and Cuban nationals by U.S.-owned or
controlled, foreign-chartered companies, and these regulations
contain no de minimis limitation.23
Iraq: The Treasury Department's Iraqi Sanctions Regulations
prohibit reexports to Iraq, the Iraqi government and entities owned
the licensing of some strategic exports. See HOMER E. MOYER, JR. & LINDA A.
MABRY, EXPORT CONTROLS AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 110-11 (1989). But
no such documents are involved in the vast bulk of possible reexport transactions
that fall under U.S. sanctions regulations, for example, reexports from Spain to
Cuba of U.S.-origin bottling equipment, which are prohibited under 15 C.F.R. §
746.2(a) (1998).
20 See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1)(d) (1998) (Cuba); Exec. Order No. 13,059, §
2(a), 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997) (Iran); 31 C.F.R. 575.205 (1998) (Iraq); 31 C.F.R. §
550.209 (Libya) (listing items in which the Libyan government has an interest); 31
C.F.R. § 500.201(b)(1) (North Korea); 31 C.F.R. § 538.205 (Sudan).
21 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.2(a), 734.3(3) (1998).
22 See 15 C.F.R. § 734.4(b). The EAR provide that the Commerce Department
will "consider[] favorably on a case-by-case basis" approval of license applications
for exports from third countries to Cuba of "non-strategic foreign-made products
that contain an insubstantial proportion of U.S.-origin materials, parts, or compo-
nents" if specified criteria are satisfied. See 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(b)(3). In
general, this policy does not apply to U.S.-owned or controlled foreign companies.
See 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(b)(3).
23 See supra Section 2.1.1. The CACR prohibition on transactions with Cuba
that involve property subject to U.S. jurisdiction could also be invoked to block
any reexport to Cuba, whether or not a U.S. person is involved. See id.
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or controlled by the Iraqi government of most goods, technology
and services that are "subject to U.S. jurisdiction."24 As discussed
above, the meaning of "subject to U.S. jurisdiction" is unclear but
could be construed to comprehend jurisdiction based merely on an
item's U.S. origin or incorporation of U.S. content.25
Iran: The Iran sanctions' reexport ban is more limited. Under
the controlling executive order, reexports by non-U.S. persons of
goods, technology and services that have been exported from the
United States are forbidden if: 1) they are effected "with knowl-
edge or reason to know" that the reexport is "intended specifically
for" Iran, the Iranian government or entities owned or controlled
by the Iranian government; and 2) such goods, technology or ser-
vices were subject to a U.S. license requirement for exports from
the United States to Iran as of May 6, 1995 or afterward. 26 The
broadest license requirements are those of the EAR, which control
exports and reexports to Iran of a variety of items for national se-
curity and foreign policy purposes, particularly for reasons relating
to efforts against terrorism. 27 The executive order exempts from
24 31 C.F.R. § 575.205 (1998).
25 See supra Section 2.1.1. EAR restrictions on reexports to Iraq are generally
limited to items otherwise controlled for particular national security and foreign
policy reasons, but, again, the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations extend to reexports of
virtually all U.S.-origin items. See 15 C.F.R. § 746.3(a) (1998). The Iraq Sanctions
Act of 1990, among other things, mandates the continued imposition of the em-
bargo embodied in the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations and generally forbids the issu-
ance of licenses for exports to Iraq under the EAR and other regulations. See Iraq
Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 101-513, §§ 586C, 586G, 104 Stat. 2048, 2051(1990) (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994)).
26 Exec. Order No. 13,059, §§ 2(b), 4(d), 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997). As this Ar-
ticle is completed, the Treasury Department's Iranian Transactions Regulations,
31 C.F.R. pt. 560, have not been amended to render them in full conformity with
Exec. Order No. 13,059.
The May 6, 1995 demarcation reflects the effective date of the executive order
that first established a comprehensive embargo against Iran. See Exec. Order No.
12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995). Export sanctions maintained under the national
emergency declared in Exec. Order No. 12,957-including those of Exec. Order
No. 13,059 and the Iranian Transaction Regulations-are not considered to be li-
cense requirements for purposes of determining the scope of the reexport ban es-
tablished by Exec. Order No. 13,059. See Exec. Order No. 13,059, § 2(b)(ii), 60 Fed.
Reg. 44,531.
27 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 742.8(a), 746.7 (1998). Apart from the EAR, other regula-
tory regimes -such as the State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regu-
lations, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (1998), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's re-
strictions on nuclear exports, 10 C.F.R. pt. 110 (1998)-also imposed license
requirements on exports to Iran as of May 6, 1995 and afterward. The Iran-Iraq
Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, in conjunction with Iraq Sanctions Act of
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the reexport prohibition administered by the Treasury Department
goods and technology that have been: (1) "substantially trans-
formed" outside the United States or (2) as in the EAR, incorporat-
ed into a foreign-made product outside the United States and con-
stitute less than ten percent of the value of that product.
28
Libya: The EAR forbid reexports to Libya of most U.S.-origin
commodities, software and technology and such items that contain
a super-de minimis level of U.S. content, although the regulations
indicate that licenses can be obtained to reexport some controlled
items.29
North Korea: Reexport sanctions against North Korea generally
mirror those against Cuba.30
Sudan: The Sudan sanctions' reexport ban, like the Iran sanc-
tions, is significantly limited. Under the Treasury Department's
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, reexports by non-U.S. persons of
goods, technology and services are forbidden only if they are sub-
ject to another federal agency's license requirement. 31 Again, the
broadest relevant reexport requirements are those of the EAR. Al-
though not comprehensive, EAR controls on reexports to Sudan
are, as with Iran, unusually expansive because these countries have
been designated as repeated supporters of international terror-
ism. 32
1990, generally forbids the issuance of licenses for exports to Iran under the EAR
and other regulations. See International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701
note (1994); Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 101-513, §§ 586C, 586G, 104 Stat. 2048,
2051 (1990) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994)).
28 See Exec. Order No. 13,059, § 2(b)(ii)(A), (B). A reexport could be subject to
a license requirement administered by an agency other than the Treasury De-
partment notwithstanding that it enjoys an exemption under Exec. Order No.
13,059.
29 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.4(b)(2), 746.4(c)(2) (1998). The Treasury Department's
Libyan Sanctions Regulations do not contain an express reexport prohibition. See
31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1998).
30 Compare 15 C.F.R. § 746.5 (1998) with 15 C.F.R. § 746.2. Compare 31 C.F.R. §
500.201(b) with 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b).
31 See 31 C.F.R. § 538.205 (1998).
32 See 31 C.F.R. § 742.10. The Secretary of State has determined that the gov-
ernments of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria have repeat-
edly provided support for acts of international terrorism under Section 6(j)(1)(A)
of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j)(1)(A). See 15 C.F.R. §
742.1(d) (1998). Consequently, broad antiterrorism export controls are mandatory
with respect to these countries under section 60) the policy of which is continued
by executive order notwithstanding the statute's lapse. See supra note 6. Antiter-
rorism controls are of less significance with respect to Cuba, Iraq, Libya and North
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U.S. reexport controls applicable to countries other than embar-
goed destinations generate far less controversy because they are
narrowly targeted at transfers of military, "dual use" and other
strategic items which are typically subject to similar export controls
maintained by other industrialized countries. 33
2.1.3. Penalties and Enforcement
The U.S. government enforces the embargo regulations
through criminal and administrative sanctions. For example, un-
der the Trading With the Enemy Act and other measures, punish-
ment for willful violations of the embargoes of Cuba and North
Korea can include fines of $250,000 and imprisonment for ten years
for individuals (including officers, directors, and agents of corpo-
rate offenders), and fines of $1 million for companies.34 The Treas-
ury Department is authorized to issue civil penalties of up to
$50,000 for noncompliance with the Cuba and North Korea embar-
goes.35 Violations of the other embargoes are punishable through
sanctions authorized by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act and other measures. 36
Korea since the embargoes establish independent, comprehensive bans on exports
and reexports to these countries.
33 Four multilateral regimes pursue coordinated export control policies in
particular areas: (1) the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms and dual-
use goods and technologies; (2) the Australia Group for chemical weapons precur-
sors, organisms of biological warfare significance and precursors; (3) the Missile
Technology Control Regime for ballistic missiles and other means of air delivery
of weapons of mass destruction; and (4) the Nuclear Suppliers Group for nuclear
material and nuclear-related dual-use items. See, e.g., Cecil Hunt & Evan R. Ber-
lack, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 11, 14-
15, 25-26 (Practising Law Institute, ed., 1996).
34 See Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 16(a) (1994 &
Supp. II 1996); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §
3571(b) (1994); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332(d) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Fines can extend as high as twice the pecuniary
gain from the offense or loss to a person other than the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §
3571(b) & (d) (1994).
35 See Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 16(b) (1994 &
Supp. II 1996); Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461 (1994). Items that are used in connection with violations are subject to for-
feiture. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16.
36 The Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan embargoes are maintained under the au-
thority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") and, de-
pending on the embargo, other statutes. The IEEPA authorizes fines and impris-
onment of up to $50,000 and 10 years, respectively, and civil penalties of up to
$10,000 for violations of IEEPA-based embargoes. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (1994).
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The U.S. government's ability to prosecute a foreign-chartered
company for an embargo violation depends on securing personal
jurisdiction over the company. In any event, the Treasury Depart-
ment sometimes pressures U.S. companies to force their foreign
subsidiaries to comply with embargo regulations that extend to all
U.S.-owned or controlled entities (now, the CACR and FACR). In a
famous such instance, Treasury directed Fruehauf, a U.S. vehicle
manufacturer, to prevent a shipment of buses by its French subsid-
iary to the Peoples' Republic of China, then subject to a compre-
hensive U.S. embargo.37 Depending on the circumstances, U.S. au-
thorities could bring a criminal prosecution or enforcement action
against the parent company of a foreign subsidiary that has vio-
lated the regulations based on theories of imputed liability.38
Moreover, the Commerce Department imposes administrative
sanctions under the EAR against foreign persons over which U.S.
forums have no jurisdiction through issuance of "denial orders." 39
Denial orders typically ban shipments and transmissions to the
sanctioned person of all EAR-regulated items, which covers most
U.S.-origin commodities, software and technology. EAR denial
orders are commonly issued against foreign persons for reexport
violations.40
2.2. Cuban Democracy Act and Helms-Burton Act
The Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in October 1992 as part
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 in response
to the Castro Regime's refusal to permit free elections and disre-
gard for human rights standards.4' Among other things, the Cu-
ban Democracy Act strengthened and expanded embargo policies
and authorized sanctions against other countries that provide as-
sistance to the Cuban government.
37 See, e.g., David, supra note 14, at 343 (quoting Professor Harold Maier who,
during a panel discussion, stated that France "put Fruehauf France, in effect, into
operating receivership until the buses were delivered. Then control went back to
Fruehauf U.S.")
38 See Ellicott, supra note 12, at 136; 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994); Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1994); Morgan, 149 F.2d at 187.
39 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(2) (1998).
40 See, e.g., ISP International Spare Parts GmbH, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,504 (1996).
41 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-484, Title XVII, 106 Stat. 2578, (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010
(1994)).
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The Cuban Democracy Act was followed in March 1996 by the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity ("LIBERTAD") Act,
popularly known as the "Helms-Burton Act."42 The Helms-Burton
Act was precipitated by Cuba's act of shooting down two unarmed
airplanes flown by anti-Castro activists. Three aspects of the stat-
ute are of particular concern to other countries and have fueled
calls for countermeasures: (1) provisions that codify by statute and
encourage intensive enforcement of the CACR; (2) provisions that
provide for a right of action to recover for "trafficking," particu-
larly by foreign persons, in property that was confiscated by the
Cuban government; and (3) provisions that bar entry into the
United States by natural persons who are "trafficking" in confis-
cated property and certain related parties.
2.2.1. Strengthening and Codification of Embargo Against Cuba
As noted above, the Cuban Democracy Act's "Mack Amend-
ment" forbids the issuance of licenses for commercial intercourse
with Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, 43 thereby ex-
acerbating the extraterritorial impact of the CACR. The Cuban
Democracy Act also restricts trade with the United States through
use of vessels that have been used for trade with Cuba or that carry
goods in which there exists a Cuban interest.
44
The Helms-Burton Act mandates that the U.S. embargo of
Cuba, including all restrictions imposed by the CACR, "remain in
effect" unless and until the embargo is suspended or terminated
consistent with statutory procedures. 45 Those procedures make
suspension or termination of the embargo contingent on a change
of political power in Cuba.
46
The statute directs the President to instruct the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General to "enforce fully" the CACR.
47
It also reinforces prohibitions against certain activities already
banned by the CACR.48
42 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (Supp. II
1996)).
43 See 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a).
44 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b).
45 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (Supp. I11996).
46 See 22 U.S.C.§ 6064.
47 22 U.S.C. § 6032(c).
48 See 22 U.S.C. § 6033 (prohibiting indirect financing transactions involving
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2.2.2. Right-of-Action Against "Traffickers" in Confiscated
Property
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act would, if implemented (see
below), enable U.S. nationals to recover in U.S. courts from persons
who "traffic" in property to which the plaintiff has a claim if the
property was confiscated by the Cuban government after January
1, 1959.49 The definition of "trafficking" broadly covers not just
dealing in but also benefiting from confiscated property. 0 Dam-
ages can equal the value of the claim as assessed by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (plus interest), the fair market
value of the subject property or triple either of these figures in
some circumstances.51
There are various limitations on this right of action. Among
them, claims acquired from others, and claims that are not certified
by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission are disfavored
in several ways and the amount in controversy must exceed
$50,000.52
confiscated Cuban property); 22 U.S.C. § 6040 (prohibiting imports of products
that are of Cuban origin, contain Cuban content or were located in or transported
through Cuba).
49 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082.
50 With some exceptions, a person "traffics" in confiscated property for pur-
poses of Title III if that person knowingly and intentionally commits the following
actions:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise
disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, pos-
sesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds
an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking . . . by an-
other person, or otherwise engages in trafficking . . . through another
person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a
claim to the property.
22 U.S.C. § 6023(13).
51 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)-(3).
52 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4), (5) & (b).
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2.2.3. Denial of Entry to "Traffickers" in Confiscated Property
Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act directs the executive branch to
deny entrance into the United States by aliens who traffic in confis-
cated property that is subject to a claim by a U.S. person.53 This
provision also applies to corporate officers of, principals of and
shareholders with a controlling interest in an entity that "has been
involved in" trafficking in confiscated property that is the subject
of a claim by a U.S. national.54 Spouses, agents, and minor children
of persons covered by these provisions are also to be excluded.
55
The alien-exclusion provisions cover only "trafficking" that oc-
curs after the law's enactment (March 12, 1996).56 The definition of
"trafficking" varies in some respects from the definition that ap-
plies to the right-of-action provisions; a congressional report pro-
vides that the alien-exclusion definition of "trafficking" is intended
to omit "sale or abandonment of confiscated property."5 7 While
the right-of-action provisions discussed above are limited to prop-
erty confiscated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959, no
53 See 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a)(2).
54 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a)(3).
55 See 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a)(4).
56 See 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a) & (d).
57 H.R. REP. No. 468, at 66 (1996). With some exceptions, a person "traffics"
in confiscated property for purposes of Title IV if that person knowingly and in-
tentionally comnits the following actions:
(i)(I) transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property,
(II) purchases, receives, obtains control of, or otherwise acquires confis-
cated property, or
(III) improves (other than for routine maintenance), invests in (by con-
tribution of funds or anything of value, other than for routine mainte-
nance), or begins after [the date of enactment of this Act,] to manage,
lease, possess, use, or hold an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) enters into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise benefiting
from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking.., by an-
other person, or otherwise engages in trafficking . .. through another
person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a
claim to the property.
22 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1996).
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such limitation exists for the alien-exclusion provisions.5 8
2.2.4. Authorization of Sanctions Against Foreign Persons
The Cuban Democracy Act authorizes the President to with-
hold from any country that provides "assistance" to the Cuban
government: (1) benefits under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
(2) aid or sales under Arms Export Control Act; and (3) eligibility
for forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to the United States gov-
ernment.5 9 "Assistance" is defined as the provision of something
of value "on terms more favorable" than those available in the
commercial market. 60
2.2.5. Implementation
Liability under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act began inuring
to "traffickers" as of August 1, 1996.61 The President, however, has
exercised his statutory authority to suspend the ability to bring suit
under Helms-Burton, and that suspension, which must be renewed
every six months, remains in place.62
In June 1996, the State Department published procedures that
govern implementation of Title IV of the Act.63 Following these
procedures, the State Department has notified major shareholders
58 Compare 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4) (Supp. II 1996) (limiting the term "confiscated"
to "seizure" of property or "repudiation" of a debt by the Cuban government tak-
ing place "on or after January 1, 1959") with 22 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(1) (making no
such date restriction on the term "confiscated").
59 See 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1994).
60 See 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(2)(A) (1994).
61 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(1), 6085(a) (Supp. II 1996).
62 See Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1265 (uly 16,
1996); Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 3 (Jan. 3, 1997);
Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1078 (July 16, 1997); State-
ment on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1966, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 81 (Jan. 16, 1998); Statement
of Action on the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.1397-98 (July 16, 1998). The President may sus-
pend the right to bring suit under Title III for six-month intervals upon reporting
to Congress that "the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the
United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." 22 U.S.C. §
6085(c)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
63 See Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996).
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and senior executives of Sherritt International, a Canadian mining
company; senior executives of Grupo Domos, a Mexican telecom-
munications firm; and, most recently, executives of the Israeli cit-
rus company Grupo B.M. that they and their families are barred
from entry into the United States under Helms-Burton.64 In July
1997, the Italian telecommunications company STET agreed to
compensate ITT of the United States for STET's use of the Cuban
telephone system on the grounds that it was confiscated from
ITT.65 The agreement was apparently driven by STET's desire to
avoid Title IV sanctions, and the State Department indicated that
no sanctions would be forthcoming against the company if the
agreement were implemented.
66
The President's suspension of the right to sue under Title III
and allegedly tepid implementation of Title IV have generated op-
position in Congress.67 A recently enacted statute requires the Sec-
retary of State to report every three months to Congress on imple-
mentation of the alien-exclusion provisions, including lists of
persons that the Secretary of State has determined are "traffickers"
in confiscated property.68 Members of Congress are also consider-
ing an amendment to eliminate suspension of the right to bring ac-
tions under Title 111.69
64 See Michael Dobbs, U.S. Announces Measures Against Canadian Firm, WASH.
POST, July 11, 1996, at A14; WASH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 18 & 19, 1997, at 2; Treasury
Reviewing Wal-Mart Canada Decision to Sell Cuban-Made Pajamas, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 17, 1997, at A-15 (discussing the four additional Sherritt
executives); Gary G. Yerkley, U.S., E.U. Making 'Significant' Progress in Helms-
Burton Law Talks, Aide Says, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 13, 1998, at A-
13. The State Department has also forwarded inquiries to several other companies
thought to be trafficking in confiscated Cuban property. See id.
65 See E.C. Says It Does Not Object to STET Settlement with ITT, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES (BNA), July 25, 1997, at A-15.
66 See Department of State News Release, Implementation of the Cuban Lib-
erty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, July 23, 1997 (statement of Nicholas
Burns).
67 Preliminary conclusions of a congressional inquiry into the implementa-
tion of the Helms-Burton Act reportedly include a finding that Title IV investiga-
tions are being delayed by high-level State Department officials. See Gilman, Ham-
ilton Square Off Over U.S.-EU Helms-Burton Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 17,
1998, at 6-7.
68 See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2802 (1998).
69 See E.U. Warns It Will Reinstate Complaint on Helms-Burton if Congress Tight-
ens Law, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 12, 1997, at A-34 (quoting Rep. Bill
McCollum (R-Fla.)).
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2.3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act was enacted less than five
months after the Helms-Burton Act in August 1996.70 It was, ac-
cording to congressional findings, motivated principally by Iran's
and Libya's support for terrorism and efforts to acquire weapons
of mass destruction. 71 As with portions of the Cuban Democracy
Act described above, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act is a secon-
dary boycott measure which mandates the imposition of sanctions
against foreign companies and sometimes their affiliates in re-
sponse to petroleum-related investment in Iran and Libya and cer-
tain other transactions with Libya. 72
2.3.1. Triggering Events and Sanctions
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act specifies that the President is
to impose at least two of seven listed sanctions against foreign per-
sons who, on or after its date of enactment, August 5, 1996, know-
ingly made an investment of US$40 million or more that "directly
and significantly contributed to the enhancement" of Iran's or
Libya's ability to develop its petroleum reserves. 73 Regarding sanc-
tions for investments in Iran, the investment threshold is US$20
million as of August 5, 1997.74 The statute also generally requires
imposition of at least two of the seven listed sanctions against per-
sons who, on or after August 5, 1996, knowingly provided to Libya
equipment and other assistance (including certain services) as pro-
hibited by U.N. resolutions against Libya if they "significantly and
materially" contribute to Libya's military or paramilitary capa-
bilities or contribute to Libya's ability to develop its petroleum re-
sources or to maintain its aviation capabilities. 75
70 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (1996) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West Supp. 1998)).
71 See 50 U.S.C.A § 2.
72 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 5.
73 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(a) & (b)(2).
74 The Act provides that, for Iran, the $40 million threshold was to drop to
$20 million as of the anniversary of the Act's date of enactment with respect to in-
vestments by nationals of countries that did not receive a waiver based on their
taking substantial steps to impede Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass de-
struction and support terrorism. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 4(d)(1). The President is-
sued no such waivers.
75 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(b)(1) (citing G.A. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3063th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) and G.A. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th
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The seven types of sanctions from which the President is to
choose are: (1) denial of Export-Import Bank assistance for exports
to the sanctioned party; (2) denial of licenses for exports to the
sanctioned party; (3) proscription on U.S. government procure-
ment of goods or services from the sanctioned party; (4) prohibi-
tion on imports from the sanctioned party; (5) ban on loans of more
than US$10 million by U.S. financial institutions to the sanctioned
parties; (6) prohibition on service by the sanctioned party as a pri-
mary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and (7) preclusion of ser-
vice by the sanctioned party as a repository of U.S. government
funds.76
2.3.2. Scope of and Limitations on Sanctions Mandate
For purposes of triggering sanctions, "investments" include en-
try into a contract to develop Iranian or Libyan petroleum resourc-
es or to supervise or guarantee performance of such a contract,
purchase of a share of ownership in such a development, or entry
into a contract to share in royalties or profits in such a develop-
ment.77 Covered investments do not include the entry into, perfor-
mance of, or financing of contracts to trade in goods, services or
technology.
78
The State Department, which has assumed the lead in adminis-
tering the statute, has issued guidance on the question of whether a
contract for management services is a potentially covered "in-
vestment" or a non-covered "service contract." 79 A series of factors
are identified including whether the person involved places capital
at risk and receives a share of income or profits.
80
Sanctions are to be imposed on any person who has "carried
out" a triggering event and its successors.81 They are also to be
imposed on parents and subsidiaries of sanctioned companies if
they knowingly "engaged in" a triggering event and affiliates that
knowingly "engaged in" a triggering event and are controlled by
Sess., 3312th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993)).
76 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 6.
77 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 14(9) (defining the term "investment").
78 See id.
79 Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg.
66,067-66,068 (1996).
80 See id.
81 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(c).
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the principal. 82 According to the State Department guidance, "en-
gaging in" a triggering event can, for a parent, include facilitating
or authorizing entry into a contract.83
The President has some flexibility in determining whether and
for how long to impose sanctions. The President can prospectively
waive application of the Iran sanctions provisions to nationals of a
country if that country has "agreed to undertake substantial meas-
ures, including economic sanctions," to deter Iran from pursuing
activities relating to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. 84 In addition, sanctions can be waived in par-
ticular cases if, among other things, doing so is "important to the
national interests of the United States." 85 The President is also au-
thorized to exempt imports of components that are essential to U.S.
products or production from sanctions.86 Once established, sanc-
tions are generally to be imposed for at least a year.87 The Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act will, by its current terms, expire on August 5,
2001.88
2.3.3. Implementation
In January 1997, the State Department fulfilled a requirement of
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act that the President publish a list of
significant oil and natural gas projects that have been tendered by
Iran.89
As of this writing, however, the United States has not imposed
sanctions under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. In a major test
case, the Clinton Administration defied substantial Congressional
pressure in May 1998 by waiving sanctions against the French
company Total SA and its Russian and Malaysian partners for a
US$2 billion investment to develop the Iranian South Pars natural
82 See id.
83 See Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed.
Reg. 66,067-66068 (1996).
84 50 U.S.C.A. § 4(c).
85 50 U.S.C.A. § 9(c).
86 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(f)(4).
87 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 9(b).
88 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 13(b).
89 See Significant Projects Which Have Been Tendered in the Oil and Gas Sec-
tor in Iran, 62 Fed. Reg. 1141 (1997). The State Department observed that "[a] pro-
ject's inclusion on or absence from the list should not be seen as relevant to a de-
termination on the imposition of sanctions." Id.
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gas field.90 This waiver was closely related to political arrange-
ments that the Administration and the European Commission also
announced in May 1998 regarding trade and investment issues (see
below Section 4). The State Department is continuing to monitor
other activities under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, including
plans by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group to build a natural gas pipe-
line through Iran,91 development of Iran's Bengestan oil and gas
reservoir, 92 and plans by various European companies to under-
take petroleum investments in Libya.93
Certain congressional leaders have vociferously criticized the
Clinton Administration's failure to impose sanctions under the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. In response to the administration's
alleged failure to implement the Act, the foremost congressional
critic, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee, has announced his intention to seek
elimination of the statute's waiver provisions.94
3. SANCTIONS COUNTERMEASURES
3.1. EU Countermeasures
The Helms-Burton Act and Iran and Libya Sanctions Act led to
the EU's issuance of Council Regulation 2271/96 in November
1996. 95 The regulation applies with respect to the Helms-Burton
Act, sanctions provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act, the prohi-
bitions, licensing provisions and penalty provisions of the CACR,
and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act ("Covered Sanctions").96
90 See EU, US Avoid Clash on Cuba, Iran Trade Laws, WASH. TRADE DAILY, May
19, 1998, at 1. The Administration issued a case-specific waiver under section 9(c)
of the Act rather than a broad, prospective waiver under section 4(c). See id. (re-
garding "national interest" waiver).
91 See Hugh Pope, Shell's Planned Iran Pipeline Poses Test for U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 16, 1998, at A15.
92 See David B. Ottaway & Martha M. Hamilton, BP Amoco Seeks to Drill in
Iran, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1999, at El.
93 See Senators Urge Albright Not to Grant ILSA Waivers for Libya Projects, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, May 29, 1998, at 14-15 (reporting efforts by several Senators to obtain
Administration commitments to sanction such investments in Libya).
94 See Gilman Announces Intent to Remove U.S. Ability to Waive ILSA Sanctions,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 5, 1998, at 1-2.
95 Council Regulation 2271/96, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1.
96 See id., Annex. The EU countermeasures regulation applies to citizens of
EU Member States, residents of the EU (apart from such residents in the country
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Regulation 2271/96 introduced four principal countermeasures
designed to counteract the Covered Sanctions:
Compliance "Blocking": The regulation forbids EU persons, "ac-
tively or by deliberate omission," to comply with requirements
"based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from" the Covered
Sanctions "whether directly or through a subsidiary or other in-
termediary person." 97 The EU Commission is authorized to allow
persons to comply with a Covered Sanction in exceptional situa-
tions. 98
Non-Recognition of Judgments: The regulation prohibits the rec-
ognition of judgments and administrative determinations that give
effect, "directly or indirectly," to the Covered Sanctions "or to ac-
tions based thereon or resulting therefrom." 99
"Clawback" Rights: EU persons engaging in commercial activi-
ties between the EU and third countries are empowered to "re-
cover any damages.., caused to" such persons by the application
of a Covered Sanction "or by actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom." 100
Reporting Requirements: The regulation requires EU persons to
report to the Commission (directly or through a Member State)
within thirty days instances in which "the economic and/or finan-
cial interests" of the person "are affected, directly or indirectly," by
a Covered Sanction "or by actions based thereon or resulting there-
from." 101
Regulation 2271/96 specifies that Member State penalties to be
imposed for violations of the regulation are to be "effective, pro-
portional and dissuasive."102 Furthermore, a regulation issued co-
incidentally with Regulation 2271/96 directs the Members States to
take measures that they consider "necessary to protect the inter-
ests" of EU persons who are affected by a Covered Sanction "inso-
of which they are citizens), other natural persons within the EU, companies incor-
porated within the EU and persons the vessels of which are registered in an EU
member State. See id., art. 11; Council Regulation 4055/86, art. 1(2), 1986 O.J. (L
378) 1. Such persons are referenced herein as "EU persons."
97 Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 5, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1.
98 See id.
99 Id. art. 4.
100 Id. art. 6.
101 Id. art. 2. The EU Commission reinforced calls for reports under Regula-
tion 2271/71 in February 1997. See Neil Buckley, E.U. Seeks Help for Helms-Burton
Case, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1997, at 5.
102 Supra note 95, art. 9.
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far as these interests are not protected" under Regulation
2271/96.103
In July 1997, the EU announced that it was initiating an investi-
gation of STET under Regulation 2271/96 in light of the agreement
to compensate ITT for STET's use of the Cuban telephone system
discussed above in Section 2.2.5.104
3.2. Canadian Countermeasures
Although it was amended in response to the Helms-Burton
Act, Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (the "FEMA")
had been in place for over ten years when the Helms-Burton Act
and Iran and Libya Sanctions Act were enacted in 1996.105 Under
the statute, countermeasures -including elements largely like
those contemplated by EU Regulation 2271/96-are implemented
through government orders.
3.2.1. FEMA Statute
The FEMA authorizes the Canadian Attorney General to issue
orders blocking compliance by "person[s] in Canada" with non-
Canadian trade laws that "adversely affect" Canadian trade inter-
ests involving business carried on in Canada or that otherwise in-
fringe on Canadian sovereignty. 106 A FEMA order can also "re-
quire any person in Canada to give notice" regarding such foreign
measures. 107 If a foreign tribunal is exercising jurisdiction in a
manner that compromises Canada's trade and sovereignty inter-
ests, the Attorney General is authorized to prohibit or restrict the
production of records and the giving of information in connection
with foreign legal proceedings. 108
Canada amended the FEMA in response to Helms-Burton in
103 Joint Action of 22 Nov., 1996, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 7.
104 See E.U. Begins Investigation of Italian Firm for Voting E.U. Anti-Helms-
Burton Rules, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Jul. 31, 1997, at A-2.
105 See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.)
[hereinafter FEMA].
106 FEMA § 5(1). Such orders require the concurrence of the Canadian Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs. See id.
107 Id. § 5(1)(a).
108 See id. § 3(1)(a)-(c). The FEMA authorizes courts to issue warrants for the
temporary seizure of any records if there is reason to believe that the Canadian
Attorney General's blocking order will be disobeyed, and the records are likely to
be turned over to foreign authorities. See id. § 4.
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late 1996.109 The FEMA amendments authorize the Canadian At-
torney General to order the non-recognition and non-enforcement
of judgements by foreign tribunals under foreign trade laws that
"adversely affect" Canadian interests.110 In addition, the amend-
ments authorize clawback suits by Canadian persons to recover
payments made to satisfy judgments handed down under the
Helms-Burton Act and other foreign laws that are actionable under
the FEMA.u l Finally, the FEMA amendments authorize the Cana-
dian Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State for External Affairs, to maintain a schedule of non-Canadian
trade laws that are, in the Attorney General's view, "contrary to in-
ternational law or international comity," the initial entry on which
is the Helms-Burton Act." 2
As amended, FEMA penalties for compliance with objection-
able foreign laws and other violations include fines of up to
C$1,500,000 for corporations and C$150,000 for individuals along
with imprisonment of individuals for up to five years." 3
3.2.2. FEMA Order
In October 1992, the Canadian Attorney General issued an or-
der under the FEMA directing Canadian-organized companies not
to comply with the "Mack Amendment," which the United States
enacted that year as part of the Cuban Democracy Act.114 As dis-
cussed above in section II.A.1, the Mack Amendment effectively
precluded, as a matter of United States law, U.S.-owned or con-
trolled foreign companies from trading with Cuba by preventing
109 See Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 28
(1997) (Can.).
110 FEMA § 8(1)(a). The amendments establish that any judgment under the
Helms-Burton Act is not to be recognized or enforced in Canada. Act to Amend
FEMA, § 7(1). Before the 1996 amendments, FEMA non-recognition and clawback
provisions related only to antitrust actions.
111 See id. §§ 8(1), 9(1). If a non-recognition order cannot be issued because
the judgement was satisfied outside Canada or the judgment is under the Helms-
Burton Act, the Canadian Attorney General can issue an order declaring that a
Canadian person has clawback rights with respect to the judgment. See id.
§ 8(1)(b).
112 Id. §§ 5(1),8.
113 See FEMA § 7(1).
114 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, 126 C. Gaz.
Part I14049 (1992); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the issuance of requisite licenses under the CACR.115
In light of concerns about proposals in the U.S. Congress that
led to the Helms-Burton Act, the FEMA order was amended in
January 1996 to cover the CACR directly and any other United
States measure "having a purpose similar to that of the" CACR
(presumably, preventing economic intercourse with Cuba). 16 The
amendment broadened the order's blocking provision, and it now
specifies that
[n]o Canadian corporation and no director, officer, manager
or employee in a position of authority of a Canadian corpo-
ration shall, in respect of any trade or commerce between
Canada and Cuba, comply with an extraterritorial measure
of the United States [i.e., the CACR or a similar measure] or
with any directive, instruction, intimation of policy or other
communication relating to such a measure that the Cana-
dian corporation or [corporate official] has received from a
person who is in a position to direct or influence the poli-
cies of the Canadian corporation in Canada."17
It appears that the order was designed to reach not only U.S.
government mandates but also "communications" from U.S. cor-
porate parents to their Canadian subsidiaries to the effect that the
subsidiaries should comply with the U.S. embargo of Cuba. 1 8 The
amended order provides further that the blocking order applies to
an "act or omission constituting compliance" with such a measure
or communication "whether or not compliance with that measure
115 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. It would seem that the Ca-
nadian order should have been directed at the CACR themselves rather than the
Mack Amendment to effectuate the goal of blocking the impact of U.S. sanctions.
116 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, amend., 130
C. Gaz. Part II 611 (1996). The amendment clarifies that the order applies with re-
spect to CACR prohibitions on trade in services and technology as well as trade in
goods and applies with respect to the CACR ban on business with parties deemed
by the Treasury Department to be "specially designated nationals" of Cuba. See
id. § 2, at 612.
117 Id. § 5, at 613.
118 Canada Amends Order Blocking U.S. Trade Restrictions, Gov't of Canada
News Release, No. 8 (Jan. 18, 1996). The Canadian government announced that
the amended order would "oblig[e] U.S. subsidiaries in Canada to deal on a nor-
mal business basis with 'specially designated nationals"' identified as sanctioned
persons under the CACR. Id.
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or communication is the only purpose of the act or omission."1 9
Finally, the FEMA order directs Canadian corporations and
their directors and officers to notify the Canadian Attorney General
of any "communication" relating to the CACR or a similar measure
"from a person who is in a position to direct or influence the poli-
cies of the Canadian corporation in Canada." 120
3.3. Countermeasures of Other Jurisdictions
In reaction to the Helms-Burton Act, Mexico enacted the Law
to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Laws that Contra-
vene International Law in October 1996.121 The Mexican statute
contains several elements included among the EU and Canadian
countermeasures. Mexican parties and, oddly, foreign persons acts
of whom "produce effects" in Mexican territory are forbidden "to
engage in acts that affect trade and investment when such acts are
the consequence of the extraterritorial effects of foreign statutes."122
The Mexican law provides for the non-recognition and non-
enforcement of foreign judgments issued under such laws.123
Mexican parties can pursue clawback claims to recover damages
under the extraterritorial foreign laws.124 Finally, the statute in-
cludes provisions forbidding responses to inquiries from foreign
countries under extraterritorial measures and requiring notification
to the Mexican government of such inquiries or activities that may
be impeded by the foreign laws. 25
The EU's Regulation 2271/96 was preceded by a series of coun-
termeasures enacted by EU members. The United Kingdom's Pro-
tection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, among other things, au-
thorizes the UK Secretary of State to "give to any person in the
United Kingdom who carries on business there such directions for
119 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Order, § 6, at 613.
120 Id. § 3(1), at 612.
121 "Ley de Protecci6n al Comercio y la Inversi6n de Normas Extranjeras que
Contravengan el Derecho Internacional," D.O., 22 de octubre de 1996.
122 Id. art. 1. A foreign statute is deemed to have "extraterritorial effects" if its
objectives include: (1) blocking trade with or investment in a country to encourage
political change in that country; (2) allowing "claiming payments from individu-
als derived from expropriations" made in such country; or (3) restricting en-
try into the country that enacted the statute to further the goals of (1) or (2). Id.
123 See id. art. 4
124 See id. art. 5.
125 See id. arts. 2 & 3.
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prohibiting compliance" with non-UK measures that govern in-
ternational trade in a way that damages UK trading interests.
126
Other EU members, such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, reportedly also maintain
countermeasures with one or more standard elements such as
blocking, non-recognition, clawback and reporting provisions.
127
4. INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. SANCTIONS AND EFFORTS
TO RECONCILE CONFLICTING POLICIES
In October 1996, the EU initiated World Trade Organization
("WTO") dispute settlement proceedings against the Helms-Burton
Act and the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The EU alleged that these
measures deny EU members' rights under General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and the General Agreement
on Trade in Services ("GATS") to export to Cuba and trade in Cu-
ban origin goods.128 The EU also articulated major concerns about
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act but did not include that statute in
its WTO case.
The United States pressed the EU to discontinue the panel pro-
ceedings on the grounds that the Helms-Burton Act involves for-
eign policy and national security issues outside the ambit of the
126 Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11, § 1 (Eng.). In response
to the Mack Amendment, see Section 2.1.1, the UK issued the Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1 (3) (Eng.) (US Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions) Order 1992 to block compliance by U.S.-owned UK companies with the
CACR prohibition on trade with Cuba. The Extraterritorial US Legislation (Sanc-
tions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading Interests) Order 1996
was issued to reconcile the 1992 order with EU Regulation 2271/96.
127 See R. Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GATT: State Sover-
eignty and the Enforcement of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 315, 317 (1995) ("To protect [their] sovereignty from outside incursion,
many [foreign] governments enacted blocking statutes to prevent compliance
with U.S discovery orders within their borders."); see, e.g., Derek Devgun, Com-
mission Proposes Response to U.S. Cuba Legislation: American Firms That Sue Could
Face Retaliation in the E.U., EUROWATCH, Sept. 16, 1996.
128 See Statement by the Representative of the European Communities and
Their Member States at the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, Oct. 16, 1996; see
also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 in Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [herein-
after WTO Agreement] Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). Canada and Mexico became third party participants
in the EU's WTO challenge. DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA), Nov. 21, 1996, at A-3.
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GAT[ 1994 and GATS. There were indications that the United
States might defend the measure before the panel through invoca-
tion of the GATT and GATS national security exemptions, but, in-
stead, the United States announced upon formation of the panel
that it simply would not participate in the case.129 Concerns
emerged that disregard of a panel decision by the United States
would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO.
Since the fall of 1996, the United States and the EU have inter-
mittently pursued negotiations regarding EU concerns over the
Helms-Burton Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and U.S.
proposals for coordinated sanctions policies. In December 1996,
the EU advanced those negotiations by adopting a "Common Posi-
tion" on Cuba that emphasized an EU policy of securing a transi-
tion in Cuba to "pluralist democracy and respect for human
rights." 30 The Clinton Administration viewed the Common Posi-
tion as a positive step that helped justify continued suspension of
the right to bring suit under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.131
In April 1997, immediately before the due date for the EU's first
substantive submission regarding the WTO case, the United States
and the EU announced an "understanding" on the basis of which
the WTO case was placed in abeyance. 32 The April 1997 accord
specified that the United States and the EU would continue discus-
sions with a goal of developing by October 15, 1997 "disciplines
and principles for the strengthening of investment protection" and
"principles" to "address and resolve" the "issue of conflicting ju-
risdictions." 133 The United States noted that its "presumption of
129 See Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at A12. It appears that the Clinton Administration pro-
ceeded on the basis that the United States had discretion to determine unilaterally
whether the agreements' national security provisions applied.
130 Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the Basis
of Article J.2 of the Treaty of the European Union, on Cuba, 1996 O.J. (L 322) 1.
131 See Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 3, 4 (Jan. 3, 1997).
Canada and Cuba issued a "Joint Declaration" in January 1997 which reinforced
their bilateral relationship, including commercial aspects of the relationship. See
Canada-Cuba Joint Declaration on Cooperation on Political, Economic, and Social
Issues, Jan. 22, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 210 (1997). This was not viewed with favor by the
United States.
132 European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concern-
ing the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, April
11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529, 530 (1997).
133 Id.
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continued suspension of Title III" of the Helms-Burton Act was
predicated on the EU's and other allies' continued "stepped up ef-
forts to promote democracy in Cuba."' 34 The document specified
that the "U.S. Administration" would seek from Congress the au-
thority to waive Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act.
135 Negotiations
continued into the spring of 1998 notwithstanding the parties' fail-
ure to meet the October 1997 deadline. The EU's suspended WTO
challenge expired in April 1998 in accordance with WTO dispute
settlement rules, although the EU remains free to bring a new case.
In May 1998, the United States and the EU concluded a "Trans-
atlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation" ("Partnership Ac-
cord") and an "Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the
Strengthening of Investment Protection" ("Investment Under-
standing"). The Partnership Accord includes limited commitments
to forego new extraterritorial sanctions.136 The Clinton Administra-
tion and the European Commission (EU executive body) agreed
"not to seek or propose" and to "resist" "the passage of new eco-
nomic sanctions legislation based on foreign policy grounds which
is designed to make economic operators of the other [partner] be-
have in a manner similar to that required of [the partner's] own
economic operators."
137
In return for that commitment, the EU conditionally agreed (as
did the United States) in the Investment Understanding to impose
certain sanctions against persons who invest in or undertake cer-
tain other transactions with respect to property that was confis-
cated in violation of international law. Unlike the Helms-Burton
Act, the Investment Understanding commitments do not apply to
past transactions. The sanctions include, among other things, de-
nial of public credit and, in some circumstances, prohibition of the
transaction. 13
8
134 Id. at 529.
135 See id. at 530.
136 See Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation, May 18, 1998,
2(h), reprinted in EU-U.S. Declaration on Political Cooperation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
May 22, 1998, at 23-7.
137 Id.
138 See Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of
Investment Protection, May 18, 1998, § I.B <http://www.eurunion.org/news
/invest.htm>. A party to the Investment Understanding is to apply the identified
sanctions if: (1) an international tribunal or court of the expropriating state deter-
mines that the property was expropriated in contravention of international law;
(2) such a determination is made by the parties to the Investment Understanding
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The United States and the EU agreed to jointly propose that the
sanctions commitments set forth in the Investment Understanding
be established as legal obligations as part of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment,139 which was then being negotiated un-
der the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development. Pending that outcome, the EU simply stated its
intention in the Investment Understanding to apply the sanctions
"on a policy basis."140 Furthermore, even this limited commitment
is contingent on the United States waiving application of Title IV of
the Helms-Burton Act (the alien-exclusion provisions) to EU per-
sons, 141 which would require that the Act be amended. The EU is-
sued a statement indicating that its implementation of sanctions
commitments in the Investment Understanding and its continuing
to forego a WTO challenge depended not only on a Title IV waiver
but also on: (1) the absence of sanctions against EU persons under
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act; and (2) continued waivers under
Helms-Burton Act Title III (right-of-action provisions).142 Prospects
for securing binding sanctions commitments from the EU deterio-
rated later in 1998 when the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
negotiations ended unsuccessfully.143
Moreover, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and other congressional supporters
of the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act re-
sponded that the Investment Understanding was insufficient to
or under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (if that agreement is estab-
lished); or (3) the party itself makes such a determination. See id. § I.B.1. Prohibi-
tion of the transaction is to be mandatory only upon a finding of illegality under
international law by an international tribunal, court of the expropriating state or
the parties to the Investment Understanding or under the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment. See id. § I.B.
139 See id. § 11.2.
140 Id.
141 See id. § 11.4.
142 See EU Unilateral Statement, May 18, 1998, <http://www.europa.
eu.int/comm/dgO1/0518uni.htm>. In its statement, the EU indicated that any
new WTO panel that it might bring would challenge not only the Helms-Burton
Act but also the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. See id. In a reference to the
planned Iran pipeline project discussed above in Section 2.3.3., the EU statement
provided that "it is axiomatic that infrastructural investment in the transport of oil
and gas through Iran be carried out without impediment." Id.
143 See Lawrence J. Speer, OECD Countries Kill MAI Talks But Say World Still
Needs Rules, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTIvEs, BNA Dec. 4, 1998, at A-9.
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warrant amending Title IV to allow for an EU waiver.144 To date,
efforts to amend Title IV and thereby bring the Investment Under-
standing sanctions commitments into force have made little pro-
gress. Administration officials are reportedly debating seeking
additional commitments or statements from the EU that might fa-
cilitate action on Title IV.
145
In June 1996, Canada and Mexico announced their intention to
challenge the Helms-Burton Act under the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").146 They have not pressed forward
with the case, however. Canada indicated that it would continue
to delay the challenge pending the outcome of the U.S./EU nego-
tiations147 and has not taken action since the conclusion of the In-
vestment Understanding.
As of February 1999, there are no active challenges to U.S. sanc-
tions under trade agreements, and the Clinton Administration has
made limited commitments to resist further extraterritorial sanc-
tions. At the same time, there remains no solid prospect of a reso-
lution that would reconcile U.S. extraterritorial sanctions with the
laws of other countries. In this regard, there apparently have been
no international negotiations on U.S. trading partners' concerns
about U.S. embargo regulations (e.g., the CACRs) or negotiations
that might lead to the revocation of sanctions countermeasures.
5. DIFFICULTIES WHEN SANCTIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES
OVERLAP
The foremost problem for a firm caught between conflicting
U.S. sanctions and foreign countermeasures is, of course, the po-
tential for legal liability. Wal-Mart's Canadian subsidiary faced the
possibility of multimillion dollar fines under the U.S. Trading With
144 See, e.g., Helms, Gilman Call for Specific Changes to U.S.-EU Sanctions Deal,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 19, 1998, at 1, 18-19 (reprinting a letter from Sen. Jesse
Helms and Rep. Benjamin Gilman to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright).
145 See Administration, Congress Examining Different Ways to Solve Helms-
Burton, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 14, 1998, at 5-6.
146 See Anne Swardson, Canada Vows Sanctions Against U.S. for Enforcement of
Anti-Cuba Trade Law, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at A7; North American Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296, 297 (1993) (citing
as its purpose the reduction of trade barriers and the establishment of mutually
advantageous trade laws).
147 See International Trade: Canada Delays Challenge of Helms-Burton Pending EU
Negotiations with United States, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTWvEs (BNA), Feb. 14, 1997, at
A-37.
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Enemy Act for sales of Cuban merchandise and the same under the
Canadian FEMA for discontinuing such sales. Both statutes also
provide for imprisonment of individual offenders.
Depending on the circumstances, foreign countermeasures
might provide a defense to prosecution under or civil enforcement
of U.S. sanctions in light of the "foreign state compulsion doctrine"
of international law. Under the foreign state compulsion doctrine,
a country is not to prevent a person from taking action in another
country that is required by the laws of that country.1 48 Making ref-
erence to this doctrine, some U.S. court opinions indicate that a
party should not be held criminally or civilly liable under U.S. law
for activity in a foreign country that is compulsory under the laws
of that country. 149
There are several potential impediments to reliance on the for-
eign state compulsion doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
affirmed use of the doctrine as a defense to criminal or civil actions,
and the theory that it should be so applied is derived largely from
lower court dicta.15o While the contours of a successful defense are
not clear even among lower courts, some have determined that the
defense will succeed only if a balance of interests favors sustaining
the policy of the foreign country.1 51 It also seems clear that a court
will intensely scrutinize whether the foreign policy is genuinely
148 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 13, §
441(1).
149 See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir.
1980) (expressing intent not to "interfere" with foreign sovereign's laws); Timber-
lane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th
Cir. 1976), affid, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to pass on validity of for-
eign laws); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1296-98 (D. Del. 1970) (recognizing foreign compulsion as a valid defense).
150 The foreign state compulsion doctrine has been used successfully as a de-
fense in at least one instance. See Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298 (upholding
use of the doctrine in antitrust litigation). See also O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota
Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1987) (implying that the
foreign state compulsion doctrine could represent a basis for insulation from li-
ability apart from the primary basis relied upon by court). The Federal Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has implied that the doctrine is inapplicable in cases
regarding international contract disputes. See McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
871 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). The Federal Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that the doctrine does not apply to the granting of patents. See
Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
151 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903-04 (2d Cir.
1968) (holding that the need to enforce a U.S. subpoena outweighed German in-
terests under bank secrecy law).
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mandatory. The Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law speci-
fies that "guidance" or "informal communications" issued by the
foreign country are insufficient to support a defense of foreign gov-
ernment compulsion.
5 2
Apart from legal liability, the conundrum of overlapping U.S.
sanctions and foreign countermeasures can give rise to serious
government affairs and public relations problems. Reports indi-
cate that difficulties arose for Wal-Mart when shoppers familiar
with the extraterritorial scope of the U.S. embargo noticed clothing
with "Made in Cuba" tags in the company's Winnipeg, Manitoba
store. Due to public scrutiny, the company was forced to issue
statements about its response to the issue (first removal of the
products and then their return).
53
6. APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING PROBLEMS
Multinational companies -particularly those with operations
in the United States and jurisdictions with sanctions countermea-
sures - are well-served by formulating and implementing a care-
fully considered approach to minimizing problems under U.S.
sanctions and foreign countermeasures.
Companies for whom sanctions and countermeasures are most
problematic are typically U.S. multinationals that have subsidiaries
in jurisdictions with countermeasures. Some such corporate
groups have chosen, for business and other reasons, to have the
foreign subsidiary operate wholly independently and without di-
rection from the parent. This model can be useful in insulating the
parent from imputed liability for the actions of the subsidiary un-
der agency, accomplice and conspiracy theories, although it will
not obviate potential conflict between U.S. and local law vis-a-vis
the foreign subsidiary.
Typically, the parent will have some level of operational con-
trol over the foreign subsidiary. If so, it is advisable for the com-
pany to take steps to exercise that control in a fully informed and
thoughtful manner designed to avoid liability under U.S. sanctions
and, to the extent possible, minimize difficulties with countermea-
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 13, at § 441
cmt. C.
153 See John Urquhart, Wal-Mart Pulls Cuban Pajamas From Canada, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 1997, at A3; John Urquhart, Wal-Mart Puts Cuban Goods Back on Sale, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 14, 1997, at A3.
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sures.
Steps that might be considered include the following:
Review Foreign Operations for Potential Exposure Under U.S. Sanc-
tions: The U.S. parent should understand the extent of potential
exposure based on a thorough review of the foreign subsidiary's
international business activities. It should know, for example,
whether there is any prospect that the subsidiary will engage in
business with Cuba or Cuban nationals if not constrained from do-
ing so by the parent. U.S. legal requirements should be examined
to assess, for example, whether the foreign subsidiary can avail it-
self of U.S. regulatory exemptions.
Ensure that the U.S. Parent Does Not Direct or Facilitate Noncom-
pliance by the Foreign Subsidiary with U.S. Sanctions: This requires a
clear understanding of U.S. law and foreign operations.
Establish Compliance Program Covering Foreign Subsidiary: Even
absent conscious direction from the parent to violate the law, the
parent invites problems under U.S. sanctions if it exercises opera-
tional control over its foreign subsidiaries but fails to establish
rules and procedures designed to ensure compliance with U.S. ex-
traterritorial requirements. 5 4 The compliance program should in-
clude elements on transaction-specific compliance checks, training
regarding sanctions requirements and periodic compliance re-
views. Compliance procedures should provide that instances of
conflict between the laws of two jurisdictions will be decided by
senior management of the subsidiary based on the advice of coun-
sel.
Consider Pursuing U.S. Authorization as Appropriate: U.S. agen-
cies generally do not license activity that is subject to sanctions
regulations. Depending on the circumstances, however, the U.S.
government might license actions by a foreign entity to avoid pre-
cipitating an international dispute. At the same time, seeking a
U.S. license might exacerbate exposure for the foreign subsidiary
under a countermeasure.
When Sanctioned Countries Are Avoided, Document Business Rea-
sons for Doing So: A foreign subsidiary's avoidance of activity
within the scope of U.S. sanctions might be attributable to reasons
unrelated to sanctions. The marketing area of the subsidiary
154 If the subsidiary is Canadian, it would be prudent to obtain the advice of
Canadian counsel on the potential application of the FEMA order's prohibition on
certain "communications" relating to the U.S. embargo of Cuba. See supra Section
3.2.2.
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might, for example, exclude Cuba for business reasons. For pur-
poses of addressing inquiries under countermeasures, it is useful to
be able to produce documentation of such business arrangements
that are contemporaneous with their establishment.
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Consider Steps to Prevent Participation by U.S. Persons in Foreign
Subsidiary's Business: Depending on the circumstances, the man-
agement of the foreign subsidiary might be compelled by counter-
measures to take action that is in noncompliance with U.S. sanc-
tions. In this regard, the company should bear in mind the risk
that liability for sanctions violations can inure to individuals who
are U.S. nationals or permanent residents. If there is a significant
possibility that the subsidiary will be forced to take action in viola-
tion of U.S. sanctions, it would be advisable that there be no U.S.
nationals or permanent residents among the subsidiary's directors,
officers and employees.
7. CONCLUSION
Although U.S. extraterritorial sanctions are drawing increas-
ing criticism in the United States and abroad, the prospects for
broad repeal of these measures are small. Indeed, it is not unlikely
that additional extraterritorial sanctions will emerge in the next
few years. At the same time, foreign sanctions countermeasures
are likely to remain in place given the Clinton Administration's in-
ability to negotiate harmonized sanctions policies with U.S. trading
partners. In these circumstances, precluding legal liability under
both U.S. sanctions and countermeasures can be a major challenge,
particularly for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.
In many cases, businesses may be unable to resolve this type of
conundrum entirely. It is prudent not to ignore the problem, how-
ever. Fully informed, judicious planning can reduce risks signifi-
cantly.
155 At the same time, the Canadian FEMA order indicates that its prohibition
on compliance with the U.S. embargo of Cuba extends to instances in which act-
ing consistently with the embargo is even partially motivated by the embargo or a
related "communication" from a corporate parent. See supra Section 2.2.2.
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